Coyotes and the Securitization of Migration: A Historical and Critical Political Economy Analysis.

I. Introduction

The figure of the “coyote,” commonly understood as a facilitator of irregular migration across borders, occupies a central yet contested place in migration studies. Often portrayed in policy discourse as a criminal intermediary, the coyote is more accurately understood as a product of structural forces, including restrictive immigration regimes, labor demand, and geopolitical inequalities. Nowhere is this more evident than along the Mexico–United States migration corridor, where coyotaje has evolved from a localized, informal practice into a complex transnational industry.

This article advances a historical and critical analysis of coyotaje, arguing that its transformation cannot be understood apart from the securitization of migration. Drawing on securitization theory, the article contends that state-led narratives framing migration as a security threat have not only justified intensified enforcement but have also contributed to the expansion and professionalization of migrant smuggling networks. By situating coyotes within broader political and economic structures, this analysis challenges reductionist depictions of smuggling as merely criminal and instead frames it as a systemic outcome of migration governance.

II. Historical Foundations of Coyotaje

Coyotaje predates contemporary border enforcement regimes and must be understood within the historical context of relatively fluid cross-border mobility. During the mid-twentieth century, particularly in the period surrounding the Bracero Program (1942–1964), labor migration between Mexico and the United States was both widespread and institutionally tolerated. Although legal channels existed, they were often insufficient or inaccessible, leading migrants to rely on informal intermediaries.

In this early phase, coyotes were typically embedded within migrant-sending communities and operated on a small scale. Their role resembled that of guides or labor brokers rather than organized criminals. Fees were relatively low, and the process relied heavily on social trust and local knowledge. As scholars have noted, these early forms of coyotaje functioned within what might be described as a “moral economy,” where economic exchange was tempered by social norms and community accountability (Spener 2009).

However, this relatively informal system began to change in the late twentieth century as migration became increasingly politicized and regulated. The gradual tightening of immigration policies laid the groundwork for a more structured and commercialized smuggling industry.

III. The Securitization of Migration and Its Consequences

To understand the transformation of coyotaje, it is necessary to engage with securitization theory, particularly as developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (1998). Securitization theory posits that issues become “securitized” when political actors frame them as existential threats requiring extraordinary measures. In the context of migration, this process has involved the construction of migrants as risks to national security, economic stability, and cultural identity.

Beginning in the 1980s and intensifying after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, migration in the United States was increasingly framed through a security lens. Policies such as the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and later enforcement strategies like Operation Gatekeeper (1994) marked a shift toward border militarization. These measures were justified through securitized discourse that linked unauthorized migration to crime, disorder, and national vulnerability.

The consequences of this securitization process were profound. Rather than reducing migration flows, heightened enforcement altered their composition and geography. Migrants were pushed away from traditional urban crossing points toward more remote and dangerous terrains, such as deserts and mountains. This shift significantly increased the risks associated with crossing and, in turn, the demand for professional guidance.

Empirical data supports this transformation. The proportion of Mexican migrants using coyotes rose dramatically from approximately 8.4% in 1995 to between 40–60% after 2005 (Hernández-Campos and Torre-Cantalapiedra 2023). At the same time, the cost of crossing increased substantially, reflecting both the heightened risks and the growing sophistication of smuggling operations. By the 2010s, migrants were paying several thousand dollars per journey, with recent estimates placing average fees between $6,000 and $8,000 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2023).

From a securitization perspective, these outcomes illustrate a paradox: policies designed to control migration have instead contributed to the expansion of the very networks they seek to eliminate. By increasing the risks of unauthorized crossing, securitization has effectively created a market for smuggling services.

IV. The Political Economy of Coyotaje

The evolution of coyotaje into a transnational industry reflects broader dynamics within the political economy of migration. As legal pathways for migration have become more restricted, the demand for alternative forms of mobility has persisted, driven by labor market needs and structural inequalities between sending and receiving countries.

Coyotaje now operates as a multi-billion-dollar industry, with estimates suggesting annual revenues of up to $6 billion. This transformation has been accompanied by increased organization and diversification. Smuggling networks often span multiple countries and involve a range of actors, including recruiters, transporters, document forgers, and enforcers. In some cases, these networks intersect with organized crime, although the extent of this relationship varies significantly across contexts.

Despite its commercialization, coyotaje remains shaped by social relations. Ethnographic research demonstrates that trust, reputation, and community ties continue to play important roles in the selection of smugglers. Migrants often rely on recommendations from family members or acquaintances, highlighting the persistence of social embeddedness even within a highly commodified system (Guevara González 2018).

At the same time, the increasing costs of smuggling have had important implications for inequality. The ability to migrate has become stratified, with poorer migrants facing greater barriers or being forced to undertake more dangerous journeys. Gender dynamics are also significant, as women often pay higher fees due to perceived vulnerabilities and the need for additional protection.

V. Smuggling, Trafficking, and the Ambiguities of Criminalization

The securitization of migration has contributed to the conflation of smuggling and trafficking within policy discourse. While both involve the movement of people across borders, they are analytically distinct. Smuggling is generally understood as a consensual transaction in which migrants pay for assistance in crossing borders, whereas trafficking involves coercion, exploitation, and the violation of fundamental rights.

However, the boundary between these categories is not always clear in practice. As enforcement intensifies and migrants become more vulnerable, instances of abuse, extortion, and violence have increased. Reports of kidnapping and exploitation along migration routes underscore the risks associated with reliance on smuggling networks.

From a critical perspective, the criminalization of coyotaje obscures the structural conditions that produce it. By focusing on smugglers as the primary problem, policymakers often overlook the role of restrictive immigration regimes and global inequalities in generating demand for their services. This narrow focus can lead to policies that exacerbate rather than alleviate migrant vulnerability.

VI. Adaptation and Technological Change

Coyotaje continues to evolve in response to changing enforcement strategies and technological developments. In recent years, smugglers have increasingly utilized digital tools, including social media platforms such as WhatsApp and TikTok, to recruit clients and coordinate journeys. This digitalization has expanded the reach of smuggling networks and facilitated new forms of organization.

At the same time, alternative migration strategies, such as large-scale migrant caravans, have emerged as both a response to and a challenge against traditional smuggling models. Some scholars argue that these developments represent a partial decommodification of migration, as collective movement reduces reliance on paid intermediaries (Frank-Vitale 2020). However, even within these contexts, coyotes often continue to play a role, adapting their services to new conditions.

VII. Securitization Revisited: A Critical Assessment

Returning to securitization theory, it becomes clear that the framing of migration as a security threat has had self-reinforcing effects. By legitimizing extraordinary measures such as border militarization, detention, and deportation, securitization has reshaped migration dynamics in ways that sustain demand for smuggling.

Moreover, securitization has implications beyond policy outcomes. It influences public perception, reinforces stereotypes, and marginalizes migrant voices. The depiction of coyotes as inherently criminal actors serves to justify punitive measures while obscuring the structural drivers of migration.

A critical application of securitization theory thus reveals the limitations of current approaches to migration governance. Rather than addressing root causes, these approaches often reproduce the conditions that sustain irregular migration and its associated industries.

Conclusion

The history of migration coyotes is inseparable from the broader processes of migration control and securitization. What began as a localized and socially embedded practice has evolved into a complex transnational industry shaped by policy decisions, economic forces, and global inequalities.

This analysis has argued that coyotaje should not be understood solely as a criminal phenomenon but as a structural outcome of restrictive migration regimes. The securitization of migration has played a central role in this transformation, creating a paradox in which efforts to control migration have contributed to the expansion of smuggling networks.

Addressing this issue requires a shift in perspective. Rather than focusing exclusively on enforcement, policymakers must consider the underlying drivers of migration, including labor demand, inequality, and the lack of legal pathways. Only by addressing these structural factors can the reliance on coyotes be meaningfully reduced.

Sources

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

Frank-Vitale, Amelia. “Coyotes, Caravans, and the Central American Migrant Smuggling Continuum.” Journal of Latin American Studies 52, no. 3 (2020): 1–25.

Gathmann, Christina. “Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets: Evidence from Migrant Smuggling along the Southwestern Border.” Journal of Public Economics 92, no. 10–11 (2008): 1926–1941.

Guevara González, Yamel. “Navigating with Coyotes: Pathways of Central American

Migrants in Mexico’s Southern Borders.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 676, no. 1 (2018): 174–193.

Hernández-Campos, Carlos M., and Eduardo Torre-Cantalapiedra. “Uso de Coyotes en la Migración Mexicana a Estados Unidos.” Estudios Fronterizos 24 (2023): 1–25.

Spener, David. Clandestine Crossings: Migrants and Coyotes on the Texas-Mexico Border. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Human Smuggling and Trafficking Statistics Report. Washington, DC, 2023.

Image: Animation: "A coyote reveals secrets of the immigrant smuggling trade"