King's College London 2022.
Throughout history, the role of information in determining outcomes of wars “has varied dramatically across conflicts and time, contributing to wide differences in judgments about the importance of intelligence in war”.[1] Historical sources and accounts illustrate that Intelligence has been used to reduce risks and uncertainty to achieve better control over events as they unfold.[2] Since the end of the Second World War, the use of Intelligence in warfare has pushed the boundaries as new frontiers (such as intuition, technology, and policymaking) have determined the way states and non-state actors engage in wars. Overall, Intelligence has become a powerful tool for both conventional and irregular warfare by enabling actions to be optimised.[3] While history proves the inherent link between Intelligence and war, many contemporary scholars believe that the use of Intelligence in conventional and irregular warfare varies in scope and capabilities. As such, one must consider the following questions: is the use of Intelligence different in conventional and irregular warfare? If so, how can such a comparison be made? To answer this question, we will first explore the definition and historical role of Intelligence and its effect on strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This will allow us to illustrate the complexity of Intelligence within conflict and how it leads to different definitions and outcomes on strategy, decision-making and policymaking. Second, we will analyse the use of Intelligence in conventional and irregular warfare. This will support the argument that while “the character and form of war are constantly changing, its fundamental nature remains the same”.[4] More importantly, it allows us to posit that essential differences between conventional and irregular warfare depend on the evaluation of their purpose, their effects, and their consequences. Finally, we will evaluate the main differences and consider the current debate surrounding the false dichotomy of irregular versus conventional warfare. Overall, this essay aims to illustrate that while the use of Intelligence can differ in conventional and irregular warfare, they are both exposed to the effects of politicisation.
The use of Intelligence in warfare
Military Intelligence is as old as warfare itself.[5] Just like war, Intelligence cannot be limited to a universal definition due to how information is obtained, used, and perceived. According to classic authors, the purpose of Intelligence has varied across time. While Sun Tzu argued that Intelligence was essential to determine the victorious outcome of both the commander and the battle, Clausewitz believed that Intelligence was often mistaken and not insightful enough to influence tactical outcomes.[6] Contrary to them, contemporary scholars have supported the idea that Intelligence has distinctive strategic, operational, and tactical roles. Under these tenets, “strategic intelligence helps guide national leaders’ political-military decision-making [while] operational intelligence is useful for designing campaigns, and tactical intelligence supports the conduct of battles and other operations”. [7] Additionally, states have developed new ways to collect information that allow them to gather and produce Intelligence more rapidly and accurately than ever before (satellites, electronic systems and devices, human sources, and other technologies). Intelligence has found new theoretical borders, mainly those that touch strategy, military operations, and decision-making processes. As such, the historical evolution of Intelligence illustrates how its use and purpose have adapted to war and the needs of state and non-state actors. For example, during biblical times, Moses sent twelve spies to live with the Canaanites to learn about their strengths and weaknesses, which resulted in finding and fighting for the ‘Promised Land’. Meanwhile, the Napoleonic campaigns crystallised unique intelligence customs, practices, and knowledge, which propelled an “era of acculturation in terms of the general transmission of knowledge in the field of intelligence gathering”.[8] Intelligence has also been a critical reason for detrimental historical events. An excellent example of this is the lack of reliable intelligence that led to the destruction of the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, which aimed to limit the U.S.A.’s ability to mobilise forces in the Pacific. Overall, one could argue that the “possession of good Intelligence in war can be, to some extent, compared to a game of cards in which one player can see some or all of his opponent's hand in a mirror. This gives him almost perfect information with the exception of that concerning his opponent's intentions”.[9] As Clausewitz mentioned, “the general unreliability of all information presents a special problem in war”.[10]
Intelligence and Conventional Warfare
Conventional warfare has been at the core of most scholarly research as it has gained historical, military, and political legitimisation. Because of this, it is usually described as a “state-on-state conflict between organised, uniformed, professional military forces using massed firepower in open space away from civilians with the aim of destroying each other to gain and hold ground.” [11] Intelligence plays different roles during conventional wars at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. At the strategic level, Intelligence warns of planned surprise attacks. This is usually done by intelligence analysts who aim to provide a warning that hostilities may occur. A unique characteristic of the strategic level in conventional warfare is that these warnings may have political, economic, sociological, and technological as well as military aspects, which suppose that Intelligence has the potential to alter decision-making processes.[12] At the operational level, Intelligence helps campaign planning, which is more military in nature, a key component of conventional warfare. Finally, at the tactical level, intelligence “warns of immediate attacks, develops target packages for operational units, and works closely with operations staffs to plan current operations”.[13] We can argue that Intelligence plays three crucial roles in conventional warfare; support decision-making, policymaking, and campaign planning. As mentioned by John Michael Schmidt, “intelligence looks backward and at current events to describe and interpret them to policy and planning decision-makers, and forward to inform and prepare those decision-makers for what Intelligence can predict to lie ahead”.[14] One example of the role of Intelligence in conventional warfare is the case of the Cold War. The study of the Cold War is filled with conflicting accounts of how relevant Intelligence was during this conflict. In fact, “the Second World War produced large and sophisticated intelligence agencies and a prize – nuclear weapon technology, which the Soviet Union sought to obtain, not least by use of its own intelligence resources.”[15] During this time, the United States was committed to obtaining as much information on the Soviet Union to prepare for critical decision-making processes and internal policies. The creation of the National Security Agency (NSA) was vital in obtaining and assessing Intelligence, but it also limited the nature of its operations to policymaking. As such, “intelligence played a vital role in helping to keep American policymakers and defense officials informed about what was going on behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War”.[16] This historical case illustrates two important points. First, even in conventional warfare, where organised states and military forces enter battle, Intelligence cannot guarantee a definitive winner. The Intelligence used during the Cold-War era was insufficient to prevent the development and use of nuclear weapons, nor did it calculate the effects of such technology in the future of warfare. Second, while the use of Intelligence in conventional war is meant to support decision-making and policy processes, its use can mirror a state’s way of fighting and thinking. As such, Intelligence can fall under certain organisational structures, rules of engagement, specific internal strategies, and the politicisation of its use.
Intelligence and Irregular Warfare
Irregular warfare shares many basic tenets of conventional warfare as they rely also on strategic, operational, and tactical processes. However, at its core, irregular warfare is a form of armed conflict that encompasses insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism. As such, irregular warfare can be defined as a struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy. It favours “indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” Contrarily to organised military campaigns, irregular warfare uses specific missions of unconventional warfare, foreign internal defence, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency”.[17] At a strategic level, Intelligence allows pursuing offensive campaigns against pre-determined threats. On an operational level, Intelligence in irregular warfare depends on “both the level of one’s understanding of the population and the deftness with which non-military and indirect means are employed to influence and build legitimacy”.[18] Successful military operations in irregular warfare require a “deliberate and sustained integration of conventional and special capabilities”[19]. This supposes that “the operating environment characteristics are very different from those associated with success in conventional warfare”. Finally, on a tactical level, Intelligence allows the use and development of specialised units, but it also redefines the use and the ability of conventional forces in irregular conflicts. As such, the use of Intelligence in irregular warfare posits two critical points. First, Intelligence concentrates on anthropologic factors (social, cultural, and economic) to pursue its strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Second, irregular warfare requires Intelligence to pursue non-military campaigns, mainly population and legitimacy influence.[20] This supposes that the role of Intelligence relies on its possible offensive capabilities instead of conflict-prevention measures. Overall, irregular warfare is surrounded by more complex geopolitical circumstances than conventional wars. This is mainly because while the objectives vary in scope and capacities, the use of Intelligence in irregular wars cannot guarantee the end of conflicts.
Conventional vs. Irregular Warfare
Both conventional and irregular warfare require Intelligence at their strategic, operational, and tactical levels. However, states and non-state actors fight differently, which supposes that they also require different intelligence capabilities and processes. In fact, “the current understanding of irregular and conventional warfare envisions them as two distinct, mutually exclusive categories. Policy documents, military doctrine, and academia support such strong differentiation”.[21] While the use of Intelligence in war is pursued by different actors, there are significant differences between conventional and irregular warfare. First, conventional warfare requires Intelligence that will support both operational strategy and political decision-making. In comparison to this perspective, irregular warfare operates in a different geopolitical environment which is very different to the requirements associated with success in conventional warfare. This supposes that at its core, the nature of the threats is generally asymmetric or irregular rather than conventional. Second, conventional warfare requires legitimation of its actions in three different spheres: social, military, and political. In comparison, irregular warfare’s success depends in large measure “not on defeating forces, but on winning the support or allegiance —or defeating the will—of populations.”[22]. Such difference implies that irregular warfare emphasises obtaining support from different segments of the population as well as a reliance on “indirect and non-military rather than military approaches”.[23] A final difference that cannot be fully verified but that can be compared by the nature of specific military operations supposes that Intelligence is not used for the same purpose. According to recent research, most irregular warfare missions and activities require information that will support operations that are essentially offensive in nature.[24] Contrary to this purpose, the use of Intelligence in conventional warfare will primarily be used for defensive operations that seek to warn states of their enemy’s intentions. Overall, the use of Intelligence in these two types of warfare shows that information is used according to the purpose, the effects, and the consequences that each state calculates.
The current debate regarding the relevance of conventional versus irregular warfare posits an essential limit to our research question. In fact, it is the “political interests of individuals and/ or the parochial interests of military and non-military organisations alike that often determine the most important policies, strategies, and decisions governing actions before and during a war”.[25] Such perception assumes that “irregular and conventional warfare entail fundamentally different warfighting behaviour, and therefore addressing them will require separate sets of military capabilities”.[26]This underlines two important points; first, there is a current need to separate the way intelligence is used in conventional and irregular warfare and second, this division creates a false dichotomy. While many reasons can explain the need to evaluate how states should prioritise each type of war, the use of Intelligence illustrates that information is easily politicised. As such, the politicisation of Intelligence supposes two critical aspects. First, such politicisation limits how Intelligence is used in conventional and irregular warfare. This means that intelligence agencies’ “supposed resistance to change […] purportedly fosters intelligence failures by maintaining dysfunctional organisational structures and cultures, which lead them to inadequately cooperate with other agencies”.[27] Second, it stipulates that Intelligence can re-evaluate how it determines strategic, operational, and tactical campaigns. Modern conflicts demonstrate that irregular actors have used conventional approaches when fighting against state adversaries. Contrarily, certain countries and states have applied irregular methods in conventional conflicts to achieve their goals. Overall, the politicization of Intelligence has legitimised the use of a wide range of warfighting methods in the most uncertain geopolitical conflicts.
Conclusion
Intelligence is an increasing, if not primary, requirement for modern warfare. History has proven that state and non-state actors have used Intelligence to pursue different objectives at different costs. While conventional and irregular warfare share basic strategic, operational, and tactical structures, their use of Intelligence varies according to the nature of the conflict. Simply put, conventional warfare pursues the use of Intelligence for decision-making and policymaking processes, while irregular warfare pursues geopolitical legitimation and influence. However, a more in-depth observation of their differences illustrates two crucial points. First, the use of intelligence in both conventional and irregular warfare is exposed to high levels of politicization due to their internal and geopolitical objectives. Second, academia needs to re-evaluate the categorization of conventional and irregular warfare. This stipulates that the use of Intelligence has the capacity to open its borders to new types of warfare. Thus, as we enter the second decade of the 21st century, it’s crucial to consider that the current conditions place an extremely heavy burden on Intelligence, suggesting a degree of expectation never seen before.[28]
[1] John A. Gentry. “Intelligence in war: how important is it? How do we know?”. Intelligence And National Security 2019, Vol. 34, No. 6, 833.
[2] Handel, Michael, ed. Intelligence and Military Operations. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 1990, 5.
[3] R.V. Jones. Intelligence and Command. Intelligence and National Security, vol.3, issue 3.
[4] Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy 2020. Department of Defense of the United States of America. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF
[5] B. W, Watson, "intelligence." Encyclopedia Britannica, February 29, 2012. https://www.britannica.com/topic/intelligence-military.
[6] John A. Gentry. “Intelligence in war: how important is it? How do we know?”. Intelligence And National Security 2019, Vol. 34, No. 6, 833.
[7] Idem, 836.
[8] Michel Roucaud. "From Campaign to Police Role: Napoleon's officers and Intelligence Gathering", Napoleonica. La Revue, vol. 27, no. 3, 2016, pp. 62-83.
[9] Michael Handel. Intelligence and Military Operation, Taylor & Francis Group, 1990, 7.
[10] Idem, Xvi.
[11] Fabian Sandor. “Irregular Versus Conventional Warfare: A Dichotomous Misconception”. Modern War Institute at West Point. https://mwi.usma.edu/irregular-versus-conventional-warfare-a-dichotomous-misconception
[12] John A. Gentry. “Intelligence in war: how important is it? How do we know?”. Intelligence And National Security 2019, Vol. 34, No. 6, 838.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Schmidt, John Michael. "Policy, planning, intelligence and foresight in government organizations." Foresight 17, no. 5 (2015), 490.
[15] Hughes Gwilym. Intelligence in the Cold War, Intelligence and National Security, 2011, 26:6, 755.
[16] Matthew M. Aid (2001) The National Security Agency and the Cold War, Intelligence & National Security, 16:1, 53.
[17] Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy 2020. Department of Defense of the United States of America. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF
[18] Eric V Larson, et al. “Assessing Irregular Warfare A Framework for Intelligence Analysis”. Rand Corporation, Arroyo Center. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG668.pdf
[19] Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy 2020. Department of Defense of the United States of America. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF
[20] Blims, Kevin. What’s In A Name? Reimagining Irregular Warfare Activities For Competition. War on the Rocks, January 15th, 2021. https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/whats-in-a-name-reimagining-irregular-warfare-activities-for-competition/
[21] Fabian Sandor. “Irregular Versus Conventional Warfare: A Dichotomous Misconception”. Modern War Institute at West Point. https://mwi.usma.edu/irregular-versus-conventional-warfare-a-dichotomous-misconception
[22] Eric V Larson, et al. “Assessing Irregular Warfare A Framework for Intelligence Analysis”. Rand Corporation, Arroyo Center. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG668.pdf
[23] Idem.
[24] Eric V Larson, et al. “Assessing Irregular Warfare A Framework for Intelligence Analysis”. Rand Corporation, Arroyo Center. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG668.pdf
[25] Michael I.. Handel, War, Strategy and Intelligence. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 1989,9.
[26] Sandor Fabian. “Irregular Versus Conventional Warfare: A Dichotomous Misconception”. Modern War Institute at West Point. https://mwi.usma.edu/irregular-versus-conventional-warfare-a-dichotomous-misconception/
[27] John A. Gentry Intelligence Learning and Adaptation: Lessons from Counterinsurgency Wars, Intelligence and National Security 2010, 25:1, 51.
[28] Wesley K Wark. Introduction: ‘Learning to Live With Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 18:4(2003), 9.
References
Books
Handel, Michael, ed. Intelligence and Military Operations. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 1990.
Journals
Aid Matthew M. (2001) The National Security Agency and the Cold War, Intelligence & National Security, 16:1, 27-66.
Gentry, John A. “Intelligence in war: how important is it? How do we know?”. Intelligence And National Security 2019, Vol. 34, No. 6, 833-850.
Gentry, John A. Intelligence Learning and Adaptation: Lessons from Counterinsurgency Wars, Intelligence and National Security, 25:1, 50-75.
Herman, Michael. Intelligence and the assessment of military capabilities: Reasonable sufficiency or the worst case?, Intelligence and National Security, 4:4 (1989), 765-799.
Hughes Gwilym. Intelligence in the Cold War, Intelligence and National Security 2011, 26:6, 755-758
McFate, M. "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture", Joint Forces Quarterly.
Manwaring, Max G. & Fishel, John T. Insurgency and counterinsurgency: Toward a new analytical approach, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 3:3 (1992), 272-310.
Roucaud, Michel. "From Campaign to Police Role: Napoleon's officers and Intelligence Gathering", Napoleonica. La Revue, vol. 27, no. 3, 2016, pp. 62-83.
Schmidt, John Michael. "Policy, planning, intelligence and foresight in government organisations." Foresight 17, no. 5 (2015), 490.
Ucko, David H. Critics gone wild: Counterinsurgency as the root of all evil, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 25: (2014) 1, 161-179.
Walsh, Patrick F. & Seumas Miller Rethinking ‘Five Eyes’ Security Intelligence Collection Policies and Practice Post Snowden, Intelligence and National Security, 31:3(2016), 345-368
Wark, Wesley K. Introduction: ‘Learning to Live With Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 18:4 (2003), 1-14.
Websites
Blims, Kevin. What’s In A Name? Reimagining Irregular Warfare Activities For Competition. War on the Rocks, January 15th, 2021. https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/whats-in-a-name-reimagining-irregular-warfare-activities-for-competition/
Larson, Eric V et al. “Assessing Irregular Warfare A Framework for Intelligence Analysis”. Rand Corporation, Arroyo Center. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG668.pdf
Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy 2020. Department of Defense of the United States of America. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF
Sandor Fabian. “Irregular Versus Conventional Warfare: A Dichotomous Misconception”. Modern War Institute at West Point. https://mwi.usma.edu/irregular-versus-conventional-warfare-a-dichotomous-misconception/
Watson, B. W.. "intelligence." Encyclopedia Britannica, February 29, 2012. https://www.britannica.com/topic/intelligence-military.
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